This paper advances the concept of ubiquitous command and control. It further contends that the concept is representative of the command and control systems we will have in the 2020s and 2030s.
INTRODUCTION
Australian Air Defence currently operates with a layered, integrated and hierarchical command and control (C 2 ) system. It has a layered system because threat and response capability both tend to vary proportionally with range. It has an integrated system because it allows asset weaknesses to be complemented by other asset strengths. It has a hierarchical system because command authority is defined by access to privileged information, which historically, has been disseminated hierarchically. But, as the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) have observed, under the information revolution in military affairs, information access is less constrained.
The author believes that hierarchical command and control systems will eventually be superseded by ubiquitous command and control systems, hereafter abbreviated as UC 2 (pronounced "you see too" -pun intended) systems. The paper's aim is to define and defend the concept of a UC 2 system. 
UC 2 SYSTEMS
Broadly speaking, a UC 2 system is a system of assets, all of which possess a similar and significant C 2 capability. In fact, a single asset will often contain multiple elements having a similar and significant C 2 capability, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
But the vision for UC 2 systems runs far deeper. To that end, section 2.1 presents 7 defining tenets of UC 2 systems; section 2.2 argues for the inevitability of UC 2 systems; and section 2.3 examines the relationship between UC 2 systems and apparent alternatives like the US Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability.
Tenets of UC 2 Systems

Decision Devolution
UC 2 systems represent a devolution of decision making power from C 2 centres to platforms which are designed to provide alternative functionality. Under this proposal, command and control becomes an additional function performed on the likes of frigates, fighters, unmanned vehicles, and missiles. This signals a significant shift in emphasis toward the tactical level, and in particular, to the warfighters. C 2 centres, as we now know them, may continue to exist, but their utility will diminish.
Ubiquity
Ubiquitous C 2 systems are so named because they advocate a C 2 capability on every platform. Indeed, individual platforms will generally have several autonomous C 2 components. The term "similar" is chosen to reflect a requirement for inter-operability, so that each platform based C 2 component can effectively communicate with the others in the UC 2 system. It equally acknowledges scope for differences, both in terms of the underlying C 2 architectures resident on platforms, and in terms of the knowledge and opinions held by those C 2 components. This contrasts with the US Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability proposal.
Automation
Automation is the primary mechanism for acquiring a similar C 2 capability on every platform. Some decision making can be fully automated. Other aspects will perform better with human interaction, with the choice between the two being mediated empirically. This promotes the role of automated decision makers and automated decision aids within UC 2 systems, with a similarity in C 2 components emanating from a similarity in the automated decision makers and aids. The automated decision aids will vary in their reliance on human cognition, ranging from elementary structured interfaces through to complex decision advisory systems.
Integration
In UC 2 systems, the automated and human decision making is fully integrated, with each assessed equally on it merits. This includes the currently controversial option of allowing the machine to at times override the human. The introduction of automated rules of engagement components (essentially legal expert systems) within weapons and weapon systems illustrate the point. The resulting "moral weapons" will have the ability to assess and decline targeting requests when rules of engagement violations are deduced. Decisions to override these moral weapons can be logged for subsequent review.
Fully integrating human and machine decision making also introduces human computer interaction issues. The success of the current computer science paradigm derives from a commitment to migrating the computer closer to the communicative practices of the human. Computers designed as logical, rather than electrical, devices; the stored program concept; machine languages; assembly languages; floating point arithmetic; higher order languages; graphical user interfaces; and speech recognition, serve to document the migration. Current command and control systems fare poorly in this respect, in that their data communication links (e.g. link 11, link 16) are primarily designed to only communicate track information, while their graphical displays are similarly handicapped as track picture displays. UC 2 systems will both exchange and present more sophisticated relationships at varying levels of abstraction.
Distributed and Decentralised
UC 2 systems primarily endorse a distributed and decentralised management structure. Each decision maker has the capacity to ask (pull knowledge), tell (push knowledge), command (push tasks) and obey (accept tasks). This potentially secures a flatter, more efficient, network structure, liberating us from a hierarchical C 2 framework whenever we choose to do so. It also introduces a command fusion problem to complement the existing information fusion problem, as each decision maker is now forced to attend to, and possibly fuse, requests for its resources from multiple sources.
Decision Making
In general, each decision maker is concurrently confronted with ask, tell, command and obey request options. In a UC 2 system, selection between these is determined by attempting to obtain the best possible outcome for the UC 2 system in the time available. There are a number of potentially controversial elements to this standpoint:
• the information fusion and decision making processes are intimately interrelated -it is not a straigtforward progression from information fusion to decision making.
• activity is decided by system utility, which need not correspond to command authority -competitive advantage can override military rank;
• optimal utility cannot always be obtained, particularly in a tactical environment -the UC 2 system must be prepared to trade the quality of its decisions in order to make them in the time available.
Management Levels
Each UC 2 system is understood and managed at four levels.
• the Individual Level, which is concerned with each individual decision maker, automated or otherwise, in the UC 2 system; • the Platform Level, which is concerned with the collection of individuals resident on a single asset platform;
• the Team Level, which is concerned with a system of assets dedicated toward achieving the same mission within the UC 2 system; and • the Sociological Level, which is concerned with the multi-mission interaction between systems of system assets. Figure 2 identifies the four levels pictorially. Individual Platform Society Team
Inevitability of UC 2 Systems
UC 2 systems will begin to emerge as new platforms come on line and legacy platforms are upgraded. This section examines reasons for thinking that the emergence of UC 2 systems is inevitable. The time frame is more difficult at judge, but the 2020s or 2030s seems appropriate.
Emerging Infrastructure
Smart decision software is steadily becoming a ubiquitous commodity throughout our society. It pervades throughout our homes, our work, our transportation, our health, and our leisure. The military environment too, has experienced the proliferation of smart decision software within its assets. The upshot is that something like a C 2 capability is steadily emerging within our assets, and the communications to efficiently link them is improving. The fact that we can readily duplicate software then becomes the crucial attribute, because duplicated software encoded human expertise is the mechanism that facilitates the ubiquitous capability.
Battlespace Effectiveness
Since the work of British Scientist F. W. Lanchester at the turn of the century, it is widely agreed that an increase in the tempo of operations acts as a force multiplier. UC 2 systems therefore offer greater utility by increasing battlespace effectiveness through an increase in the tempo of operations. This increase is accomplished by:
• enabling both information and commands to be sent directly to where they are needed; and • allowing the quality of decisions made to be traded to accommodate the time constraints.
Surgical Strike
In the Information Age, C 2 centres have become the enemy's centre of gravity, and are therefore the prime targets for surgical strike with precision weapons. In defending against surgical strike, one approach is to build a duplicate C 2 centre. The neutralisation of the C 2 centre is then less catastrophic, as the duplicate centre can assume its function. But redundancy offers only one level of reprieve. By enabling C 2 functionality to reconfigure as necessary, ubiquity offers greater sustainability, by enabling the quality of defence to degrade gracefully, rather than instantaneously, under the threat of surgical strike. In principle, defeating a UC 2 system amounts to defeating all of its assets.
UC 2 versus CEC
In learning to assimilate a new notion, an appreciation of what it isn't is often as valuable as an account of what it is. In that regard it is convenient to briefly compare the Cooperative Engagement Capability, hereafter abbreviated CEC in customary style, with the UC 2 proposal.
Cooperative Engagement Capability
The CEC approach favoured by the US Navy bares some similarity to the UC 2 proposal. CEC shares with UC 2 a commitment to a distributed information and command architecture. This empowers assets to make decisions whose consequences bare upon the actions of other assets in the system, and so for example, allows target sensing and the subsequent weapons delivery to be mounted from different platforms. The benefits of UC 2 systems include those cited for CEC systems.
Thus the principal tenets of CEC are: In contrast, regarding the same three tenets, UC 2 systems allow that:
• level 0 (sensor measurement data) to level 4 data should be disseminated to selected assets when desired to increase utility; • each asset should possess a similar architecture and possess similar C 2 knowledge for a ubiquitous capability, but may prefer different algorithms when engaging the same battlespace; and • thus, each asset can form a perspectival picture of the battlespace. The UC 2 philosophy precludes neither the complete uniformity of CEC, nor its complete diversity dipole. As Figure 3 depicts, the CEC framework is merely one rather extreme type of UC 2 system.
Complete Uniformity
Complete Diversity UC 2 Systems CEC Systems
The extent to which uniformity or diversity should intrude upon a UC 2 system bares careful consideration. The author's predisposition is to reject the extreme uniformity demanded by the CEC programme for two reasons.
• The ability to guarantee uniform real-time processing in every asset is dubious. In a real-time environment, what is done depends greatly on the time and capability to do it. Communication instability and the variations in communication arrival times provide a source of difficulty, as does the different tasking requirements placed on different assets. A more pragmatic posture is to accept that diversity will arise in the system, either by fault or circumstance, and to design the system to manage it.
• If one element of the CEC network gets it wrong, then all elements of the CEC network get it wrong! One of the great lessons of Biology is that diversity breeds survivability 1 . If correctly managed, diversity engenders system robustness.
MANAGING UC 2 SYSTEMS
Propositional Attitudes
Section 2.1.4 noted that the success of the current computer science paradigm derives from its commitment to migrating the computer closer to the communicative practices of the human. If this strategy is pursued to its logical conclusion, then interaction with the computer becomes indistinguishable from interaction with a human. So how do we interact with humans -how do we communicate with them, and how do we predict and explain their behaviour?
An analysis of our language shows that we interact with humans by ascribing mental attitudes to them, such as beliefs, desires, expectations, fears, hopes et cetera, and it is on the basis of such ascriptions that we choose our communications and predict and explain human behaviour. Perhaps then, we ought to interact with our computers as if they have beliefs, desires, expectations, fears, hopes et cetera. Indeed, viewing machines in this way is not entirely foreign, for as [3] first observed, when confronted by a complex chess playing computer, we instinctively ascribe beliefs and desires to the machine in order to predict and explain its moves.
Expressions having this syntactic form are called propositional attitude expressions and the beliefs, desires, hopes et cetera that they denote are termed propositional attitudes. In propositional attitude expressions:
• the subject, e.g.
b ¢ $
, expresses which individual has the propositional attitude;
• the proposition, e.g.
, expresses some assertion about the world; and • the attitude, e.g.
, expresses the kind of response the subject has toward the proposition.
The author contends that if we reason about intelligent machines, such as chess computers, through propositional attitudes, then we ought to interface with intelligent machines through propositional attitudes, and this includes the programming interface. With subtle modification, propositional attitude observations like
The latter is an instruction, commanding Fred to believe that the sky is blue. The application of propositional attitude instructions as programming language instructions is termed attitude programming by the author. The author's ATTITUDE architecture implements attitude programming through the use of belief, desire expectation and anticipation constructs [4] .
Preferential Requirements
Propositional attitude expressions identify a commonplace formalism for describing sophisticated relationships between the individuals (both real and virtual) comprising a UC 2 system and, through attitude programming, facilitate a means of automating such descriptions. Propositional attitude expressions therefore provide a formalism for the management of UC 2 systems, where managing a UC 2 system means organising the system to meet certain requirements. The author distinguishes two kinds of requirements for UC 2 systems: preferential requirements and critical requirements.
Much of the management of a UC 2 system is concerned with preferential trade-offs. The scope for trade-offs depends upon the level of autonomy available, and this varies as we progress through the four levels of a UC 2 system.
Individual
An individual located on a platform will have specific duties which greatly constrains the scope of tasks that they attempt. The desires imposed upon an individual will often require decisions in real-time and the individual will often be required to preferentially juggle multiple independent desires so as to achieve the best outcome in the time available. Computationally this invites the use of design-to-time [5] , anytime [6] or imprecise [7] decision processes.
Platform
At the platform level, the individuals on a platform are constrained by their co-location, the role of the platform, and their level of coordination. As the time constraints at the platform level are a little less foreboding, while the activities of the individuals on the platform need to be tightly coupled, it is possible to nominate an individual on the platform, hereafter termed the platform commander, as the broker for all independent desires to be attempted by the platform. The commander must decide which independent desires are to be attempted by the platform so as to provide the best outcome, and these give rise to dependent desires subsequently undertaken by platform individuals.
The commander's problem can be formulated mathematically. At any moment t, the execution state of the commander will include, inter alia, a set of independent desires I t ≡ ≡ {i 1,t , ..., i p,t }; a set of beliefs B t ≡ ≡ {b 1,t , ..., b m,t }; and a set of procedures or routines R t ≡ ≡ {r 1,t , ..., r s,t }. The beliefs classify the world; the routines define internal, and consequently external, behaviours which transform these beliefs, most often by transforming the world; and the independent desires serve to nominate which beliefs the commander would subsequently prefer and by when. Thus each i j,t ∈ I t , has some deadline d(i j,t ). The commander's problem is then the problem of best utilising the routines available in R t to transform the beliefs of B t to minimise the dissatisfaction of I t .
To formalise this problem, let I t,k ≡ ≡ {i | i ∈ I t & d(i) ≤ k}. I t,k identifies the independent desires at time t which need to be satisfied by time k. The success of the routines selected at time t can then be judged for each time k by comparing the degree of mismatch between I t,k and B k , which is denoted by mismatch(I t,k , B k ). The overall dissatisfaction is then the cumulative effect of mismatches for each time moment k, which can be The commander's problem is to minimise the dissatisfaction function at each time t, which is essentially a temporal shortest path problem. Whether obtained by dynamic programming or more heuristic means, the author terms any solution to this problem prescheduling.
Team
The platforms comprising a team form sorties which are constrained by the mission uniting them. Decision making at this level offers greater autonomy. For example, a commercial airliner might perhaps be temporarily conscripted within a mission team because it happens to be strategically positioned to benefit the team's mission. The gain in autonomous mobility both enriches each platform's capacity to contribute and dissuades against a more vulnerable centralised structure. As a consequence, team decision making is decentralised to the platforms comprising the team.
It is assumed that the platforms composing the mission based teams are prepared to cooperatively contribute to the goals (desires) of the mission. One approach is to extend the prescheduling process communally.
• The mission can be represented by a communal desire set. The communal desire set decomposes the mission into independent desires for the community's assets and is maintained dynamically throughout the course of the mission. • Each collaborating asset retains its own personal account of the communal desire set but has the ability to copy, edit and then communicate variations for communal approval. Upgrades to the communal desire set should improve the expectation for mission satisfaction and have each relevant asset endorse it before it becomes the next communal desire set.
• The collaborating agents must seek to satisfy the desires of the communal desire set. This not only requires their participation to fulfil some of those desires, but also requires that their behaviour does not prohibit other agents from satisfying some of the remaining desires. Within the research literature on multi-agent cooperation, this is termed a joint intention approach [8, 9] . Alternatives also exist within the literature [10] .
Society
A society of individuals consists of a collection of platform teams, each defined by some mission. Management becomes a societal issue when these teams choose to share assets in order to fulfil their individual ambitions more efficiently. As the missions may to some extent be in conflict, a cooperative environment cannot be presumed. Interaction between societies is therefore likely to proceed by negotiation. One approach to societal scheduling is to employ a utilitarian (game theoretic) framework to secure agreements which mutually advantage the participating communities [11] . 
Critical Requirements
The critical requirements for a UC 2 system identify constraints which the system must comply with at all times. The critical requirements specify the behavioural boundaries of the UC 2 system, typically by citing failsafe conditions. As all of the critical requirements must be met, a measure of guarantee is inappropriate. A given UC 2 system either always satisfies all of the critical requirements of Γ, in which case that system is verified, or it fails to satisfy at least one of the requirements of Γ, in which case that system is unverified. The management of critical requirements to ensure that only verified UC 2 systems can be deployed, necessitates some means of determining whether the critical conditions will always be met by a given UC 2 system design.
It is proposed that attitude logics 2 be developed to provide a mathematical notion of proof through which we can prove whether a specified design satisfies the critical requirements for a UC 2 system. As such logics are highly expressive, they will certainly be undecidable. The onus is therefore on the designer seeking verification to construct their design so that undecidability issues do not come into play when proving that each of the critical requirements is a consequence of the design. This could be accomplished by implementing explicit checks within the design.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited, the emergence of UC 2 systems, or something similar, is inevitable in the next half century. It is unlikely that C 2 centres as we now know them will cease, but we can expect a significant devolution of their current responsibilities out to the platforms.
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